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| First-Price Auction× | Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) メカニズム× | |
|---|---|---|
| 分野 | ゲーム理論 | ゲーム理論 |
| 系統 | Machine learning | Machine learning |
| 提唱年 | 1961 | 1961 |
| 提唱者≠ | William Vickrey | William Vickrey, Edward Clarke, Theodore Groves |
| 種類 | algorithm | algorithm |
| 原典 | Vickrey, W. (1961). Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed bids. The Journal of Finance, 16(1), 8-37. DOI ↗ | Vickrey, W. (1961). Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed bids. The Journal of Finance, 16(1), 8-37. DOI ↗ |
| 別名 | FPSB, Sealed-Bid Auction, Bid-Equal-Price Auction | Vickrey Mechanism, Generalized Vickrey Auction, Truthful Mechanism |
| 関連 | 4 | 4 |
| 概要≠ | A first-price auction is a sealed-bid mechanism where all participants submit bids simultaneously without knowing others' bids. The highest bidder wins and pays their own bid (the price they offered). Systematically analyzed by William Vickrey in 1961, first-price auctions require bidders to balance between winning and profit, leading to strategic underbidding relative to true valuations in equilibrium. | The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) Mechanism is a truthful mechanism design solution that allocates resources and determines payments to incentivize participants to reveal their true valuations. Building on William Vickrey's 1961 sealed-bid auction work and extended by Clarke and Groves, VCG ensures that reporting truth is a dominant strategy for all participants, achieving allocative efficiency while maximizing total surplus. |
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