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| First-Price Auction× | クールノー競争× | |
|---|---|---|
| 分野 | ゲーム理論 | ゲーム理論 |
| 系統 | Machine learning | Machine learning |
| 提唱年≠ | 1961 | 1838 |
| 提唱者≠ | William Vickrey | Augustin-Louis Cournot |
| 種類 | algorithm | algorithm |
| 原典≠ | Vickrey, W. (1961). Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed bids. The Journal of Finance, 16(1), 8-37. DOI ↗ | Cournot, A. A. (1838). Recherches sur les principes mathématiques de la théorie des richesses. L. Hachette. link ↗ |
| 別名 | FPSB, Sealed-Bid Auction, Bid-Equal-Price Auction | Quantity Competition, Cournot Equilibrium, Cournot-Nash Equilibrium |
| 関連 | 4 | 4 |
| 概要≠ | A first-price auction is a sealed-bid mechanism where all participants submit bids simultaneously without knowing others' bids. The highest bidder wins and pays their own bid (the price they offered). Systematically analyzed by William Vickrey in 1961, first-price auctions require bidders to balance between winning and profit, leading to strategic underbidding relative to true valuations in equilibrium. | Cournot Competition models oligopolistic markets where firms choose quantities simultaneously, not prices. Originally formulated by Augustin-Louis Cournot in 1838, the model assumes each firm's profit depends on the total market quantity produced. The resulting Cournot-Nash Equilibrium captures the strategic interaction where each firm maximizes profit given competitors' quantities, leading to prices between monopoly and perfect competition levels. |
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