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| First-Price Auction× | ベイジアン・ナッシュ均衡× | |
|---|---|---|
| 分野 | ゲーム理論 | ゲーム理論 |
| 系統 | Machine learning | Machine learning |
| 提唱年≠ | 1961 | 1967 |
| 提唱者≠ | William Vickrey | John Harsanyi |
| 種類 | algorithm | algorithm |
| 原典≠ | Vickrey, W. (1961). Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed bids. The Journal of Finance, 16(1), 8-37. DOI ↗ | Harsanyi, J. C. (1967). Games with incomplete information played by Bayesian players, Parts I, II, and III. Management Science, 14(3), 159-182. DOI ↗ |
| 別名 | FPSB, Sealed-Bid Auction, Bid-Equal-Price Auction | BNE, Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, Type-Contingent Equilibrium |
| 関連 | 4 | 4 |
| 概要≠ | A first-price auction is a sealed-bid mechanism where all participants submit bids simultaneously without knowing others' bids. The highest bidder wins and pays their own bid (the price they offered). Systematically analyzed by William Vickrey in 1961, first-price auctions require bidders to balance between winning and profit, leading to strategic underbidding relative to true valuations in equilibrium. | Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) extends Nash Equilibrium to games with incomplete information, where players lack full knowledge of others' payoff functions. Introduced by John Harsanyi in 1967, BNE models strategic interaction under uncertainty by representing unknown payoffs as players' private types drawn from a probability distribution. Equilibrium is found by solving for type-contingent strategies that are best responses to all possible type realizations. |
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