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| 独裁者ゲーム(Dictator Game)× | 最後通牒ゲーム× | |
|---|---|---|
| 分野 | 心理学 | 心理学 |
| 系統 | Hypothesis test | Hypothesis test |
| 提唱年≠ | 1994 | 1982 |
| 提唱者≠ | Robert Forsythe and colleagues | Werner Güth, Rolf Schmittberger, and Bernd Schwarze |
| 種類≠ | Allocation task | Behavioral economics task |
| 原典≠ | Forsythe, R., Horowitz, J. L., Savin, N. E., & Sefton, M. (1994). Fairness in simple bargaining experiments. Games and Economic Behavior, 6(3), 347-369. DOI ↗ | Güth, W., Schmittberger, R., & Schwarze, B. (1982). An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 3(4), 367-388. DOI ↗ |
| 別名 | Allocation Game, Distribution Task | Ultimatum Bargaining, Division Game |
| 関連 | 1 | 1 |
| 概要≠ | The Dictator Game is a simple economic decision task measuring generosity and prosocial behavior. One player (dictator) receives money and unilaterally decides how to allocate it between themselves and an anonymous second player (recipient). The recipient cannot reject the offer; they simply receive what the dictator gives. Unlike the Ultimatum Game, the dictator faces no punishment for selfishness. Thus, the Dictator Game reveals baseline generosity without strategic calculation, revealing intrinsic prosocial preferences. | The Ultimatum Game is a two-player economic decision-making task that reveals preferences for fairness and social norms. One player (proposer) receives money and offers a portion to a second player (responder). The responder accepts or rejects the offer; if accepted, both receive their share; if rejected, both receive nothing. Economic theory predicts responders should accept any positive offer (better than zero), yet responders often reject unfair offers. This gap between predictions and behavior reveals that fairness concerns, equity sensitivity, and social punishment shape economic decisions. |
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