手法を比較

	Dependency Analysis	Rent-Seeking Analysis
分野	Political Economy	Political Economy
系統	Process / pipeline	MCDM
提唱年	1966	1967
提唱者	Andre Gunder Frank; Fernando Henrique Cardoso & Enzo Faletto	Gordon Tullock & Anne Krueger
種類	Historical-structural development framework	Formal model of political-economic waste
原典	Cardoso, F. H., & Faletto, E. (1979). Dependency and Development in Latin America. University of California Press. ISBN: 9780520031937	Tullock, G. (1967). The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft. Western Economic Journal, 5(3), 224-232.
別名	Dependency Theory, Dependencia Analysis, Center-Periphery Analysis, Underdevelopment Theory	Rent-Seeking Theory, Tullock Rent-Seeking Analysis, Rent-Seeking Contest Model, Directly Unproductive Profit-Seeking
関連	4	4
概要	Dependency analysis is a historical-structural framework for explaining the persistent underdevelopment of poorer countries, developed by Latin American and dependency scholars in the 1960s and 1970s. Its founding claim, sharpened by Andre Gunder Frank in 'The Development of Underdevelopment' (1966), is that the poverty of the periphery is not a backward original condition awaiting modernization but is actively produced by the region's subordinate relation to the wealthy center: through colonial and post-colonial trade, the periphery's surplus is siphoned to the metropole via unequal exchange. Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, in Dependency and Development in Latin America (1979), gave the tradition its most influential statement by insisting that dependency operates through the internal class structures and political alliances of peripheral societies, producing not stagnation alone but particular, distorted forms of 'associated-dependent' development.	Rent-seeking analysis is the political-economy framework for measuring the social waste created when individuals and firms spend real resources competing for artificially created rents — the extra income generated by monopoly grants, tariffs, licenses, quotas, and other government-conferred privileges — rather than producing new wealth. Gordon Tullock's 1967 article showed that the conventional Harberger triangle drastically understates the cost of monopoly and protection, because the rectangle of monopoly profit, far from being a mere transfer, becomes a prize that competitors will expend resources to capture. Anne Krueger named the activity 'rent-seeking' in 1974 and demonstrated its macroeconomic scale in regulated developing economies. The analysis models the competition for a rent as a contest and asks how much of the prize is dissipated in the struggle to win it.