Confronta i metodi

	Political Budget Cycle Analysis	Partisan Business Cycle Analysis
Campo	Political Economy	Political Economy
Famiglia	Regression model	Regression model
Anno di origine	1990	1977
Ideatore	Kenneth Rogoff (building on William Nordhaus)	Douglas Hibbs (partisan theory); Alberto Alesina (rational partisan theory)
Tipo	Panel econometric model of opportunistic fiscal policy	Time-series econometric model of partisan macroeconomic outcomes
Fonte seminale	Rogoff, K. (1990). Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles. American Economic Review, 80(1), 21-36.	Hibbs, D. A. (1977). Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy. American Political Science Review, 71(4), 1467-1487.
Alias	Electoral Budget Cycle Analysis, Opportunistic Fiscal Cycle Model, Pre-Election Fiscal Manipulation Analysis, Election-Year Deficit Model	Partisan Theory Analysis, Rational Partisan Theory, Hibbs Partisan Model, Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy
Correlati	3	3
Sintesi	Political budget cycle analysis is an econometric framework for detecting whether incumbent governments manipulate fiscal policy — deficits, public spending, or taxes — in the run-up to elections to signal competence and win votes. Kenneth Rogoff's 1990 equilibrium model gave the idea rational micro-foundations: even forward-looking voters can be temporarily fooled when competence is imperfectly observed, so able incumbents distort the fiscal mix before an election to separate themselves from less able rivals. Empirically the cycle is identified by an election-timing indicator in a fixed-effects panel regression of fiscal outcomes, and Brender and Drazen's 2005 study showed the effect is concentrated in new, inexperienced democracies rather than established ones.	Partisan business cycle analysis tests whether left-wing and right-wing governments produce systematically different macroeconomic outcomes. Douglas Hibbs's 1977 partisan theory argued that because left and right parties represent constituencies with different exposures to unemployment and inflation, left governments durably push for lower unemployment while tolerating higher inflation, and right governments do the reverse. Alberto Alesina's 1987 rational partisan theory added rational expectations and nominal wage contracts: when parties differ and election outcomes are uncertain, the surprise of who wins generates only a transitory burst of partisan divergence in output and employment, which fades once contracts adjust. The empirical method regresses macroeconomic series on a partisan government indicator and post-election dummies to distinguish permanent from transitory effects.