Public Goods Game
The public goods game is the canonical multi-person social dilemma used to study cooperation. Each member of a group is endowed with money and simultaneously decides how much to keep privately and how much to contribute to a common pool; the pool is multiplied and split equally among all members regardless of contribution. Because the marginal per-capita return is less than one but the group return exceeds one, every individual is privately better off free-riding while the group is collectively better off if all contribute -- the defining tension of a social dilemma. Experiments consistently show people contribute well above the self-interested zero, but contributions decay over repeated rounds unless institutions intervene. Fehr and Gachter's influential demonstration that allowing players to pay to punish free-riders restores and sustains high cooperation made the paradigm central to research on norms, altruistic punishment, and collective action.
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Sumber
- Fehr, E., & Gachter, S. (2000). Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments. American Economic Review, 90(4), 980-994. DOI: 10.1257/aer.90.4.980 ↗
- Berg, J., Dickhaut, J., & McCabe, K. (1995). Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History. Games and Economic Behavior, 10(1), 122-142. DOI: 10.1006/game.1995.1027 ↗
Cara menyitasi halaman ini
ScholarGate. (2026, June 23). Public Goods Game (Voluntary Contribution Mechanism). ScholarGate. https://scholargate.app/id/social-psychology/public-goods-game
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