Módszerek összehasonlítása

	Two-Level Game Analysis	Shapley-érték
Tudományterület	Political Science	Játékelmélet
Módszercsalád	MCDM	Machine learning
Keletkezés éve	1988	1953
Megalkotó	Robert D. Putnam	Lloyd Shapley
Típus	Framework for analyzing international negotiation under domestic constraints	algorithm
Alapmű	Putnam, R. D. (1988). Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games. International Organization, 42(3), 427-460.	Shapley, L. S. (1953). A value for n-person games. In H. W. Kuhn & A. W. Tucker (Eds.), Contributions to the Theory of Games II (pp. 307-317). Princeton University Press.
Alternatív nevek	Two-Level Games, Putnam Two-Level Game Framework, Win-Set Analysis, Double-Edged Diplomacy	Fair Division, Cooperative Game Solution, Dividend Vector
Kapcsolódó	4	4
Összefoglaló	Two-level game analysis is a framework introduced by Robert Putnam in 1988 for understanding how international negotiations are jointly shaped by bargaining between governments and the need to win domestic approval. A negotiator plays simultaneously at two tables: Level I, where states bargain over an agreement, and Level II, where that agreement must be ratified by domestic constituents. The key analytic device is the win-set — the set of Level I deals that could secure domestic ratification — and an agreement is possible only where the negotiating states' win-sets overlap.	The Shapley Value is a solution concept for coalition games that distributes total payoff fairly among players based on their marginal contributions to coalitions. Introduced by Lloyd Shapley in 1953, the Shapley Value is the unique payoff distribution that satisfies four intuitive axioms: efficiency (total payoff is distributed), symmetry (identical players receive equal payoff), null player (players contributing nothing receive nothing), and additivity across games.