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| Sanctions Effectiveness Analysis× | Bargaining Model of War× | |
|---|---|---|
| Tudományterület | International Relations | International Relations |
| Módszercsalád≠ | Process / pipeline | MCDM |
| Keletkezés éve≠ | 2007 | 1995 |
| Megalkotó≠ | Gary Hufbauer, Jeffrey Schott, Kimberly Elliott & Barbara Oegg (HSE/HSEO dataset) | James D. Fearon |
| Típus≠ | Coding and statistical analysis of sanctions episodes and outcomes | Formal model of war as bargaining failure |
| Alapmű≠ | Hufbauer, G. C., Schott, J. J., Elliott, K. A., & Oegg, B. (2007). Economic Sanctions Reconsidered (3rd ed.). Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics. link ↗ | Fearon, J. D. (1995). Rationalist explanations for war. International Organization, 49(3), 379–414. DOI ↗ |
| Alternatív nevek | Economic Sanctions Analysis, Sanctions Success Analysis, Sanctions Outcome Analysis, Economic Statecraft Effectiveness | Rationalist Explanations for War, Bargaining Theory of War, Crisis Bargaining Model, Fearon Bargaining Model |
| Kapcsolódó | 3 | 3 |
| Összefoglaló≠ | Sanctions effectiveness analysis is the systematic study of when economic sanctions achieve their political goals. Anchored by the Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott, and Oegg dataset of sanctions episodes (Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3rd ed., 2007), it codes each case for its objectives, instruments, costs, and outcome, then analyzes which conditions — multilateral support, modest goals, target vulnerability — predict success. Because states choose when to impose sanctions and targets choose how to respond, the field is centrally concerned with the selection problems that complicate any simple verdict on whether sanctions 'work.' | The bargaining model of war, given its canonical statement by James Fearon in 'Rationalist Explanations for War' (1995), treats war not as the failure of reason but as a failure of bargaining. Because fighting is costly and uncertain, there almost always exists a peaceful division of the disputed stakes that both rational states would prefer to the gamble of war. The puzzle, and the model's central contribution, is to identify the specific conditions — private information with incentives to misrepresent, commitment problems, and issue indivisibility — under which rational, unitary states nonetheless fail to reach such a settlement. |
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