Módszerek összehasonlítása

	Political Survival Analysis	Government Formation Model
Tudományterület	Political Economy	Political Economy
Módszercsalád	Survival analysis	MCDM
Keletkezés éve	2003	1989
Megalkotó	Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al.; Janet Box-Steffensmeier & Bradford Jones	David Baron & John Ferejohn; David Austen-Smith & Jeffrey Banks
Típus	Survival / event-history regression model	Non-cooperative bargaining model of government formation
Alapmű	Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M., & Morrow, J. D. (2003). The Logic of Political Survival. MIT Press. ISBN: 9780262025461	Baron, D. P., & Ferejohn, J. A. (1989). Bargaining in Legislatures. American Political Science Review, 83(4), 1181-1206.
Alternatív nevek	Leader Survival Analysis, Government Duration Analysis, Selectorate Survival Model, Political Event-History Analysis	Legislative Bargaining Model, Baron-Ferejohn Model, Formateur Model, Portfolio Allocation Model
Kapcsolódó	3	4
Összefoglaló	Political survival analysis applies survival and event-history models to the time leaders, governments, and regimes remain in power before failing. Methodologically it rests on the hazard-modeling apparatus codified for social scientists by Box-Steffensmeier and Jones in 2004 — the Cox proportional-hazards model and parametric alternatives such as the Weibull, estimated on duration data with censoring. Substantively it is anchored in the selectorate theory of Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow's 2003 The Logic of Political Survival, which explains the hazard of losing office in terms of the size of the winning coalition (W) and the selectorate (S). The model links institutional structure and performance to the risk that an incumbent's tenure ends.	The government formation model is a non-cooperative bargaining theory explaining how a cabinet and the division of its portfolios emerge when no party holds a majority. In the canonical Baron-Ferejohn (1989) framework, a head of state or chance mechanism recognizes one party as formateur with a probability often proportional to its seat share; the formateur proposes a government and an allocation of the spoils of office, and the proposal takes effect only if a legislative majority accepts. Austen-Smith and Banks (1988) embed this in an electoral and coalition setting. The model's signature result is a proposer (formateur) advantage: the party that gets to propose secures a disproportionate share of portfolios.