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| Elite Cue Experiment× | Partisan Motivated Reasoning Paradigm× | |
|---|---|---|
| Tudományterület | Politikai pszichológia | Politikai pszichológia |
| Módszercsalád | Process / pipeline | Process / pipeline |
| Keletkezés éve≠ | 1992 | 2006 |
| Megalkotó≠ | John Zaller; Stephen Nicholson | Charles Taber & Milton Lodge |
| Típus≠ | Survey experiment on source cues | Experimental paradigm for directional reasoning |
| Alapmű≠ | Zaller, J. R. (1992). The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion. Cambridge University Press. ISBN: 9780521407861 | Taber, C. S., & Lodge, M. (2006). Motivated Skepticism in the Evaluation of Political Beliefs. American Journal of Political Science, 50(3), 755-769. DOI ↗ |
| Alternatív nevek | Party Cue Experiment, Source Cue Persuasion Experiment, Partisan Endorsement Cue Design, Elite Endorsement Experiment | Motivated Skepticism Paradigm, Directional Motivated Reasoning Design, Disconfirmation Bias Experiment, Partisan Bias Information-Processing Paradigm |
| Kapcsolódó | 3 | 3 |
| Összefoglaló≠ | An elite cue experiment isolates the persuasive power of source endorsements by holding a policy message constant and randomly varying who is said to support it. Grounded in John Zaller's receive-accept-sample model of mass opinion, which holds that citizens take cues from trusted political elites rather than reasoning from first principles, the design reveals how much opinion moves simply because a party or leader takes a side. Stephen Nicholson's work on polarizing cues shows that in-party endorsements can persuade while out-party endorsements provoke backlash, making the cue, not the argument, the engine of opinion change. | The partisan motivated reasoning paradigm is the experimental template for showing that citizens process political information to protect their existing loyalties rather than to reach accurate conclusions. In Taber and Lodge's foundational 2006 design, partisans who read balanced pro and con arguments rated congenial arguments as stronger, spent effort counterarguing uncongenial ones, sought out confirming information, and ended up more extreme than they began. Martin Bisgaard's later work extends the logic to facts, showing that even when partisans accept the same factual reality they reinterpret who deserves credit or blame, so getting the facts right can paradoxically fuel rather than dampen partisan reasoning. |
| ScholarGateAdatkészlet ↗ |
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