Módszerek összehasonlítása

	AES (Rijndael)	Lineáris kriptoanalízis	Oldalcsatorna-elemzés
Tudományterület	Kriptográfia	Kriptográfia	Kriptográfia
Módszercsalád	Machine learning	Machine learning	Machine learning
Keletkezés éve	2001	1993	1996
Megalkotó	Joan Daemen	Mitsuru Matsui	Paul Kocher
Típus	symmetric encryption algorithm	linear approximation attack	physical side-channel exploitation
Alapmű	Daemen, J., & Rijmen, V. (2002). The Design of Rijndael: AES - The Advanced Encryption Standard. Springer-Verlag. ISBN: 978-3540425809	Matsui, M. (1993). Linear cryptanalysis method for DES cipher. In Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 1993, LNCS 765, pp. 386-397.	Kocher, P. C. (1996). Timing attacks on implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and other systems. In Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 1996, LNCS 1109, pp. 104-113.
Alternatív nevek	Rijndael, AES encryption, FIPS 197	linear attack, linear approximation, piling-up lemma	SCA, timing attack, power analysis, cache attack
Kapcsolódó	4	3	3
Összefoglaló	The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), also known as Rijndael, is a symmetric block cipher adopted as the official encryption standard by the U.S. government in 2001. It processes data in 128-bit blocks using 128, 192, or 256-bit keys and performs multiple rounds of substitution, permutation, and mixing operations. AES is the most widely used symmetric encryption algorithm today, securing everything from government communications to everyday internet traffic.	Linear cryptanalysis is a known-plaintext attack that exploits linear approximations of a cipher's non-linear transformations to recover secret key bits. Introduced by Mitsuru Matsui in 1993, linear cryptanalysis provides practical attacks on ciphers like DES with computational complexity less than brute force. The technique analyzes statistical biases in how linear combinations of plaintext and ciphertext bits relate to key bits, enabling key recovery with reduced data requirements.	Side-channel analysis is a family of attacks that exploit physical properties of cryptographic implementations (timing, power consumption, electromagnetic emissions, cache behavior) to recover secret keys. Introduced by Paul Kocher in 1996, side-channel attacks have repeatedly broken implementations of theoretically secure cryptosystems by leveraging unintended information leakage. Side-channel analysis has become a critical concern in cryptographic system design, requiring constant-time implementations and physical countermeasures.