Zapis dokaza metode

Selectorate Theory Analysis

Selectorate theory, developed by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph Siverson, and James Morrow in The Logic of Political Survival (2003), explains policy and foreign-policy behavior as a by-product of leaders' overriding goal: staying in power. Every leader depends on a winning coalition (W) drawn from a larger selectorate (S) of those with a say in choosing leaders. The relative size of W and S determines whether a leader buys loyalty with broad public goods or narrow private rewards — which in turn shapes growth, war, peace, and the survival of regimes.

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Selectorate Theory of Political Survival and Foreign Policy

Taksonomski zapis metode · mcdm / international-relations

Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M., & Morrow, J. D. (2003). The Logic of Political Survival. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. · ISBN 9780262025461

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Used in the same domainDemocratic Peace Analysismachine-suggested · Relational suggestion, not evidence.Same method familyExpected Utility Model of Warmachine-suggested · Relational suggestion, not evidence.Used in the same domainPolity Score Analysismachine-suggested · Relational suggestion, not evidence.