Public Goods Game
The public goods game is the canonical multi-person social dilemma used to study cooperation. Each member of a group is endowed with money and simultaneously decides how much to keep privately and how much to contribute to a common pool; the pool is multiplied and split equally among all members regardless of contribution. Because the marginal per-capita return is less than one but the group return exceeds one, every individual is privately better off free-riding while the group is collectively better off if all contribute -- the defining tension of a social dilemma. Experiments consistently show people contribute well above the self-interested zero, but contributions decay over repeated rounds unless institutions intervene. Fehr and Gachter's influential demonstration that allowing players to pay to punish free-riders restores and sustains high cooperation made the paradigm central to research on norms, altruistic punishment, and collective action.
Izvorni zapis
Citati kopirani doslovno iz izvornog zapisa metode. Ne impliciraju nikakvu provjeru na razini tvrdnje.
- Fehr, E., & Gachter, S. (2000). Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments. American Economic Review, 90(4), 980-994. · DOI 10.1257/aer.90.4.980
- Berg, J., Dickhaut, J., & McCabe, K. (1995). Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History. Games and Economic Behavior, 10(1), 122-142. · DOI 10.1006/game.1995.1027
Uređene tvrdnje
Tvrdnje pohranjene u knjigu dokaza, svaka s vlastitom procjenom.
Ovaj prikaz ne izmišlja procjenu tvrdnje kada knjiga dokaza nema nijednu.
Povezane metode
Generirano iz grafa metode i prikazano kao strojno predložene relacije — ne implicira se nikakva tvrdnja dokaza.