Principal-Agent Model
The Principal-Agent Model analyzes how a principal (e.g., owner, employer, policymaker) can incentivize an agent (e.g., manager, employee, firm) to act in the principal's interest when the agent has private information or can take hidden actions. Formalized by Jensen and Meckling in 1976, the model identifies agency costs arising from moral hazard (the agent exerts less effort than desired) and adverse selection (the agent hides unfavorable information). Optimal contracts balance incentives with risk allocation.
Izvorni zapis
Citati kopirani doslovno iz izvornog zapisa metode. Ne impliciraju nikakvu provjeru na razini tvrdnje.
- Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305-360. · DOI 10.1016/0304-405X(76)90026-X
- Holmstrom, B. (1991). The firm as a subpoena server. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 7(2), 53-64. · URL
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Povezane metode
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