השוואת שיטות

	קריפטואנליזה דיפרנציאלית	AES (Rijndael)	ניתוח ערוץ צדדי
תחום	קריפטוגרפיה	קריפטוגרפיה	קריפטוגרפיה
משפחה	Machine learning	Machine learning	Machine learning
שנת המקור	1990	2001	1996
הוגה השיטה	Eli Biham	Joan Daemen	Paul Kocher
סוג	statistical attack on block ciphers	symmetric encryption algorithm	physical side-channel exploitation
מקור מכונן	Biham, E., & Shamir, A. (1990). Differential cryptanalysis of DES-like cryptosystems. In Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 1990, LNCS 537, pp. 2-21.	Daemen, J., & Rijmen, V. (2002). The Design of Rijndael: AES - The Advanced Encryption Standard. Springer-Verlag. ISBN: 978-3540425809	Kocher, P. C. (1996). Timing attacks on implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and other systems. In Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 1996, LNCS 1109, pp. 104-113.
כינויים	differential attack, differential path, differential probability	Rijndael, AES encryption, FIPS 197	SCA, timing attack, power analysis, cache attack
קשורות	3	4	3
תקציר	Differential cryptanalysis is a statistical attack technique on symmetric block ciphers that analyzes differences in inputs and outputs to recover secret keys. Introduced by Eli Biham and Adi Shamir in 1990, differential cryptanalysis was the first practical attack on DES that outperformed brute force search. The technique exploits non-random properties of cipher transformations by studying how small changes in plaintext propagate through the cipher rounds. Differential cryptanalysis has shaped cipher design for three decades.	The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), also known as Rijndael, is a symmetric block cipher adopted as the official encryption standard by the U.S. government in 2001. It processes data in 128-bit blocks using 128, 192, or 256-bit keys and performs multiple rounds of substitution, permutation, and mixing operations. AES is the most widely used symmetric encryption algorithm today, securing everything from government communications to everyday internet traffic.	Side-channel analysis is a family of attacks that exploit physical properties of cryptographic implementations (timing, power consumption, electromagnetic emissions, cache behavior) to recover secret keys. Introduced by Paul Kocher in 1996, side-channel attacks have repeatedly broken implementations of theoretically secure cryptosystems by leveraging unintended information leakage. Side-channel analysis has become a critical concern in cryptographic system design, requiring constant-time implementations and physical countermeasures.