השוואת שיטות

	קריפטואנליזה דיפרנציאלית	ניתוח ערוץ צדדי
תחום	קריפטוגרפיה	קריפטוגרפיה
משפחה	Machine learning	Machine learning
שנת המקור	1990	1996
הוגה השיטה	Eli Biham	Paul Kocher
סוג	statistical attack on block ciphers	physical side-channel exploitation
מקור מכונן	Biham, E., & Shamir, A. (1990). Differential cryptanalysis of DES-like cryptosystems. In Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 1990, LNCS 537, pp. 2-21.	Kocher, P. C. (1996). Timing attacks on implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and other systems. In Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 1996, LNCS 1109, pp. 104-113.
כינויים	differential attack, differential path, differential probability	SCA, timing attack, power analysis, cache attack
קשורות	3	3
תקציר	Differential cryptanalysis is a statistical attack technique on symmetric block ciphers that analyzes differences in inputs and outputs to recover secret keys. Introduced by Eli Biham and Adi Shamir in 1990, differential cryptanalysis was the first practical attack on DES that outperformed brute force search. The technique exploits non-random properties of cipher transformations by studying how small changes in plaintext propagate through the cipher rounds. Differential cryptanalysis has shaped cipher design for three decades.	Side-channel analysis is a family of attacks that exploit physical properties of cryptographic implementations (timing, power consumption, electromagnetic emissions, cache behavior) to recover secret keys. Introduced by Paul Kocher in 1996, side-channel attacks have repeatedly broken implementations of theoretically secure cryptosystems by leveraging unintended information leakage. Side-channel analysis has become a critical concern in cryptographic system design, requiring constant-time implementations and physical countermeasures.