Comparer des méthodes

	Équilibre parfait en sous-jeux	Théorie des jeux évolutionnistes
Domaine	Théorie des jeux	Théorie des jeux
Famille	Machine learning	Machine learning
Année d'origine	1965	1973
Auteur d'origine	Reinhard Selten	John Maynard Smith, George Price
Type	algorithm	algorithm
Source fondatrice	Selten, R. (1965). Spieltheoretische Behandlung eines Oligopolmodells mit Nachfrageträgheit. Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 121, 301-324.	Smith, J. M., & Price, G. R. (1973). The logic of animal conflict. Nature, 246(5427), 15-18.
Alias	Backward Induction, Sequential Equilibrium, Extensive-Form Equilibrium	ESS, Evolutionarily Stable Strategy, Replicator Dynamics
Apparentées	4	4
Résumé	Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) is a refinement of Nash Equilibrium for sequential games, introduced by Reinhard Selten in 1965. It requires that strategy profiles constitute a Nash Equilibrium in every subgame, eliminating non-credible threats and incredible promises. Backward induction is the primary computational method for finding SPE in finite games.	Evolutionary Game Theory applies game-theoretic reasoning to biological evolution and social dynamics, where populations of agents with different strategies interact repeatedly. Introduced by John Maynard Smith and George Price in 1973, the framework uses the concept of Evolutionarily Stable Strategies (ESS) to identify strategy distributions that cannot be invaded by mutant strategies. Replicator dynamics describe how strategy frequencies evolve over time when reproduction is proportional to payoff success.