Comparer des méthodes

	Concurrence de Stackelberg	Équilibre de Nash
Domaine	Théorie des jeux	Théorie des jeux
Famille	Machine learning	Machine learning
Année d'origine	1934	1950
Auteur d'origine	Heinrich von Stackelberg	John Nash
Type	algorithm	algorithm
Source fondatrice	von Stackelberg, H. (1934). Marktform und Gleichgewicht. Julius Springer.	Nash, J. F. (1950). Equilibrium points in N-person games. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 36(1), 48-49.
Alias	Quantity Leadership, Sequential Oligopoly, Stackelberg Equilibrium	Lemke-Howson Equilibrium, Completely Labeled Pair
Apparentées	4	4
Résumé	Stackelberg Competition models sequential oligopolistic markets where one firm (the leader) commits to a quantity first, and other firms (followers) observe this choice and respond. Introduced by Heinrich von Stackelberg in 1934, the model captures first-mover advantage in quantity-setting competition. The resulting Stackelberg Equilibrium, found by backward induction, yields the leader higher profit than simultaneous (Cournot) competition.	Nash Equilibrium is a game-theoretic solution concept where no player can unilaterally deviate to improve their payoff. Formalized by John Nash in 1950, the Lemke-Howson algorithm computationally finds equilibria in bimatrix games by identifying completely labeled vertex pairs in the strategy polytopes.