Comparer des méthodes

	Analyse d'arbres de défaillance assistée par simulation	Analyse de l'arbre de défaillance basée sur le risque
Domaine	Plans d'expériences	Plans d'expériences
Famille	Process / pipeline	Process / pipeline
Année d'origine	1970s–1980s (widespread adoption in nuclear and aerospace industries)	1961 (FTA origin); risk-based integration formalised 1975–1981
Auteur d'origine	Fault tree analysis: H. A. Watson (Bell Labs, 1961); Monte Carlo integration in reliability: Herman Kahn / Stanislaw Ulam (RAND, late 1940s); combination formalized in reliability engineering literature from the 1970s onward	H.A. Watson (Bell Labs) and developed further by Boeing/U.S. Air Force; risk-based extension via NRC probabilistic risk assessment programs
Type	Quantitative reliability and risk analysis technique	Quantitative safety and reliability analysis
Source fondatrice	Vesely, W. E., Goldberg, F. F., Roberts, N. H., & Haasl, D. F. (1981). Fault Tree Handbook. US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG-0492.	Vesely, W. E., Goldberg, F. F., Roberts, N. H., & Haasl, D. F. (1981). Fault Tree Handbook. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG-0492.
Alias	SA-FTA, Monte Carlo FTA, simulation-based FTA, stochastic fault tree analysis	RB-FTA, risk-informed FTA, quantitative fault tree analysis, probabilistic fault tree analysis
Apparentées	6	6
Résumé	Simulation-assisted fault tree analysis (SA-FTA) combines the logical structure of classical fault tree analysis with Monte Carlo or discrete-event simulation to estimate the probability and timing of an undesired top event when component failures follow complex, non-exponential, or correlated probability distributions. The approach overcomes the analytical limitations of Boolean algebra-based FTA and is widely used in nuclear, aerospace, chemical process, and manufacturing reliability engineering.	Risk-based fault tree analysis (RB-FTA) combines classical fault tree analysis with explicit quantitative risk assessment. Starting from an undesired top event, the analyst decomposes it into contributing causes using AND/OR logic gates, assigns failure probabilities to basic events from reliability databases or historical data, and then propagates those probabilities through the tree to compute top-event likelihood. The result is expressed as risk — probability weighted by consequence severity — enabling prioritisation of safety interventions by their actual risk reduction impact.