Comparer des méthodes
Examinez les méthodes sélectionnées côte à côte ; les lignes qui diffèrent sont mises en évidence.
| Median Voter Model× | Spatial Voting Model× | |
|---|---|---|
| Domaine≠ | Political Economy | Political Science |
| Famille | MCDM | MCDM |
| Année d'origine≠ | 1948 | 1957 |
| Auteur d'origine≠ | Duncan Black & Anthony Downs | Harold Hotelling, Duncan Black & Anthony Downs |
| Type≠ | Formal model of electoral competition | Formal model of electoral and legislative choice |
| Source fondatrice≠ | Black, D. (1948). On the Rationale of Group Decision-making. Journal of Political Economy, 56(1), 23-34. DOI ↗ | Downs, A. (1957). An Economic Theory of Democracy. Harper & Row. ISBN: 9780060417505 |
| Alias | Median Voter Theorem, Black's Median Voter Theorem, Downsian Median Voter Model, Median Voter Equilibrium | Spatial Theory of Voting, Downsian Model, Proximity Voting Model, Median Voter Model |
| Apparentées | 4 | 4 |
| Résumé≠ | The median voter model is a foundational result of political economy stating that, under majority rule with voters whose preferences are single-peaked on a single policy dimension, the ideal point of the median voter is the Condorcet winner — it cannot be beaten by any other alternative in pairwise majority voting. Duncan Black established the theorem formally in 1948, and Anthony Downs extended it in 1957 into a theory of party competition in which two vote-maximizing parties converge to the median voter's preferred policy. The model is the workhorse linking the distribution of citizen preferences to equilibrium policy outcomes in democracies. | The spatial voting model represents voters and political alternatives as points in a common geometric policy space and assumes that each voter supports the alternative nearest to their own ideal point. Rooted in Hotelling's location theory, Duncan Black's 1948 single-peakedness result, and Anthony Downs's 1957 economic theory of democracy, the model yields two foundational results: the median voter theorem, which identifies the equilibrium policy in one dimension, and the Downsian prediction that two vote-seeking parties converge toward the center. It is the workhorse formalism behind modern empirical estimation of political positions. |
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