Does remembering something count as a way of knowing it?

Memory is standardly counted as a source of knowledge, but there is debate over whether it produces new justification or only preserves what one already had. On the preservationist view memory can sustain knowledge across time but cannot upgrade an originally unjustified belief into knowledge.

Is introspection infallible?

Traditionally introspection was thought to give privileged, even infallible, access to one's own mind. Contemporary philosophers and psychologists argue that introspective reports can be mistaken or systematically biased, so introspection is now widely regarded as an important but fallible source.

Memory and Introspection

Two inward-facing sources support much of what we know: memory, which preserves and supplies beliefs formed earlier, and introspection, through which we seem to know our own present mental states with special directness.

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Definition

Memory and introspection are inward epistemic sources: memory is the faculty by which previously acquired information is retained and made available to justify belief, while introspection is the faculty by which one comes to know one's own occurrent mental states.

Scope

This topic covers the epistemology of memory — whether memory generates new justification or only preserves it, and how memory beliefs can be justified despite the loss of their original grounds — and the epistemology of introspection — the apparent privileged or even infallible access we have to our own thoughts and sensations, and the challenges to that picture. It connects to foundationalism, which often treats introspective beliefs as basic. Perception and a priori reason are treated in separate topics.

Core questions

Does memory generate justification or merely transmit justification acquired earlier?
How can a memory belief be justified when its original evidence is forgotten?
Do we have privileged or infallible access to our own mental states?
Can introspection misrepresent the states it reports?

Key concepts

Preservationism versus generativism about memorial justification
Apparent memory and the forgotten-evidence problem
Privileged access and first-person authority
Infallibility, incorrigibility, and self-intimation of mental states
Self-knowledge and the reliability of introspection

History

Reflection on memory's reliability goes back to the early modern theories of ideas and to Russell's worry that the world might have sprung into being five minutes ago complete with apparent memories. Introspection was long taken to give certain access to the mind, a view central to Cartesian foundationalism; recent work, drawing on psychology, has questioned how accurate introspection really is, reopening the epistemology of self-knowledge.

Debates

Whether memory can generate justification: Preservationists hold that memory only retains the justification a belief originally had, so it cannot make an unjustified belief justified, while generativists argue that under some conditions memory itself confers fresh justification; the forgotten-evidence problem drives the dispute.

Key figures

Bertrand Russell
Robert Audi
Eric Schwitzgebel

Seminal works

russell1921
audi2010

Frequently asked questions

Does remembering something count as a way of knowing it?: Memory is standardly counted as a source of knowledge, but there is debate over whether it produces new justification or only preserves what one already had. On the preservationist view memory can sustain knowledge across time but cannot upgrade an originally unjustified belief into knowledge.
Is introspection infallible?: Traditionally introspection was thought to give privileged, even infallible, access to one's own mind. Contemporary philosophers and psychologists argue that introspective reports can be mistaken or systematically biased, so introspection is now widely regarded as an important but fallible source.