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Stackelberg-kilpailu×Nash-tasapaino×
TieteenalaPeliteoriaPeliteoria
MenetelmäperheMachine learningMachine learning
Syntyvuosi19341950
KehittäjäHeinrich von StackelbergJohn Nash
Tyyppialgorithmalgorithm
Alkuperäislähdevon Stackelberg, H. (1934). Marktform und Gleichgewicht. Julius Springer. link ↗Nash, J. F. (1950). Equilibrium points in N-person games. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 36(1), 48-49. DOI ↗
RinnakkaisnimetQuantity Leadership, Sequential Oligopoly, Stackelberg EquilibriumLemke-Howson Equilibrium, Completely Labeled Pair
Liittyvät44
TiivistelmäStackelberg Competition models sequential oligopolistic markets where one firm (the leader) commits to a quantity first, and other firms (followers) observe this choice and respond. Introduced by Heinrich von Stackelberg in 1934, the model captures first-mover advantage in quantity-setting competition. The resulting Stackelberg Equilibrium, found by backward induction, yields the leader higher profit than simultaneous (Cournot) competition.Nash Equilibrium is a game-theoretic solution concept where no player can unilaterally deviate to improve their payoff. Formalized by John Nash in 1950, the Lemke-Howson algorithm computationally finds equilibria in bimatrix games by identifying completely labeled vertex pairs in the strategy polytopes.
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ScholarGateVertaile menetelmiä: Stackelberg Competition · Nash Equilibrium. Haettu 2026-06-19 osoitteesta https://scholargate.app/fi/compare