مقایسهٔ روشها
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| Transaction Cost Economics Analysis× | Diversification-Performance Analysis (Rumelt Categories)× | |
|---|---|---|
| حوزه | مدیریت استراتژیک | مدیریت استراتژیک |
| خانواده | Process / pipeline | Process / pipeline |
| سال پیدایش≠ | 1979 | 1974 |
| پدیدآور≠ | Oliver E. Williamson | Richard P. Rumelt; Krishna Palepu |
| نوع≠ | Comparative-governance framework for organizing transactions efficiently | Classification-and-comparison pipeline relating diversification type to firm performance |
| منبع بنیادین≠ | Williamson, O. E. (1985). The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting. New York: Free Press. ISBN: 9780029348208 | Rumelt, R. P. (1974). Strategy, Structure, and Economic Performance. Division of Research, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University. ISBN: 9780875841090 |
| نامهای دیگر | Transaction Cost Economics (TCE), Make-or-Buy Governance Analysis, Asset Specificity Governance Analysis, Markets-and-Hierarchies Analysis | Rumelt Diversification Category Analysis, Related vs Unrelated Diversification Analysis, Corporate Diversification Strategy Classification, Diversification Strategy-Performance Linkage |
| مرتبط | 3 | 3 |
| خلاصه≠ | Transaction cost economics (TCE) analysis explains how firms should organize their economic exchanges -- whether to buy on the market, make in-house, or use a hybrid arrangement -- by minimizing the sum of production and transaction costs. Building on Coase's question of why firms exist, Oliver Williamson's 1979 article and 1985 book The Economic Institutions of Capitalism developed a comparative framework in which the efficient governance of a transaction depends on its attributes, above all asset specificity, together with uncertainty and frequency. Because human actors are boundedly rational and potentially opportunistic, contracts are inevitably incomplete; when a transaction requires investments specialized to a particular partner, those investments create quasi-rents that the partner can try to expropriate -- the hold-up problem. The central prescription, the discriminating-alignment hypothesis, is to match each transaction to the governance structure -- market, hybrid, or hierarchy -- that economizes on these transaction costs, making the make-or-buy decision a question of comparative institutional efficiency. | Diversification-performance analysis asks whether the kind of diversification a firm pursues — staying focused, expanding into related businesses, or building an unrelated conglomerate — is systematically associated with how well the firm performs. The categorical version originates with Rumelt's 1974 Strategy, Structure, and Economic Performance, which classified diversified firms by specialization and relatedness ratios into single-business, dominant-business, related, and unrelated types and found that related diversifiers tended to outperform unrelated ones. Palepu's 1985 study reframed diversification with the continuous Jacquemin-Berry entropy measure, again finding that related diversification was associated with superior profit growth, and showed how the index approach and Rumelt's categorical method can be combined to gain both objectivity and conceptual richness. |
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