The Mind-Body Problem
The mind-body problem asks how mental phenomena such as thoughts, sensations, and consciousness relate to physical phenomena such as brains and bodies.
Definition
The mind-body problem is the cluster of questions concerning the nature of the relationship between mental states and processes and physical states and processes, in particular whether the mental is identical to, reducible to, dependent on, or distinct from the physical.
Scope
This area covers the central metaphysical positions on the relation between mind and matter: dualism, the various forms of physicalism (identity theory, functionalism, eliminativism), and the conceptual tools used to frame the debate, including supervenience and the explanatory gap. It concerns what minds fundamentally are and whether mental properties can be reduced to or identified with physical ones.
Sub-topics
Core questions
- Are mental states identical to brain states, or are they something distinct?
- If minds are non-physical, how can they causally interact with physical bodies?
- Can mental properties be reduced to or fully explained by physical properties?
- What does it mean to say the mental supervenes on the physical?
- Why is there an explanatory gap between physical descriptions and conscious experience?
Key concepts
- dualism
- physicalism
- identity theory
- multiple realizability
- supervenience
- explanatory gap
Key theories
- Substance dualism
- Mind and body are two fundamentally different kinds of substance; the mind is non-physical and can in principle exist independently of the body, as argued by Descartes.
- Type identity theory
- Mental state types are identical to physical (neural) state types, so that, for example, pain just is a particular brain process.
- Functionalism
- Mental states are defined by their causal-functional roles rather than by their physical constitution, allowing the same mental state to be realized in different physical systems.
History
The modern formulation derives from Descartes's seventeenth-century distinction between thinking substance (res cogitans) and extended substance (res extensa). The mid-twentieth century saw the rise of physicalist alternatives: the identity theory of Place, Feigl, and Smart, followed by functionalism in response to the problem of multiple realizability. Later work, including Kim's analyses of supervenience and Chalmers's case for the hard problem, refined and challenged physicalist orthodoxy.
Debates
- Reducibility of the mental
- Whether mental properties can be reduced to physical properties, or whether multiple realizability and the explanatory gap block any such reduction.
- Causal interaction
- Whether a non-physical mind could causally interact with a physical body without violating the causal closure of the physical domain.
Key figures
- Rene Descartes
- J. J. C. Smart
- Hilary Putnam
- Jaegwon Kim
- David Chalmers
Related topics
Seminal works
- descartes1641
- smart1959
- kim2011
- chalmers1996
Frequently asked questions
- What is the difference between dualism and physicalism?
- Dualism holds that the mind is a non-physical entity or property distinct from the body, while physicalism holds that everything, including the mind, is ultimately physical.
- What is the mind-body problem in simple terms?
- It is the question of how mental life, such as thoughts and feelings, is connected to the physical brain and body.