The Hard Problem of Consciousness

The hard problem is the question of why and how physical processes in the brain give rise to subjective experience at all.

Definition

The hard problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining why physical processing is accompanied by subjective experience rather than proceeding in the dark, as distinct from the easy problems of explaining cognitive and behavioral functions.

Scope

This topic covers Chalmers's distinction between the easy problems and the hard problem of consciousness, its relation to the explanatory gap, and the principal responses: type-A deflationism, type-B a posteriori physicalism, and non-reductive or panpsychist alternatives.

Core questions

• Why is any physical process accompanied by experience at all?
• How does the hard problem differ from the easy problems of consciousness?
• Can a complete physical and functional account leave anything unexplained?
• Do deflationary responses dissolve the problem or change the subject?

Key concepts

• easy problems
• hard problem
• explanatory gap
• zombies
• type-B physicalism
• deflationism

Key theories

The easy/hard distinction

The easy problems concern explaining functions such as discrimination and report, which yield to standard methods; the hard problem is why such functions are accompanied by experience.

Deflationism about the hard problem

Once all the functions are explained, there is no further fact of experience left over; the appearance of a residual problem is an illusion of introspection.

History

Levine (1983) first articulated the explanatory gap, and Chalmers (1995, 1996) crystallized it as the hard problem and used it to argue against reductive physicalism. Dennett and other deflationists have replied that the hard problem trades on illusions about introspective access, making the debate a focal point of consciousness studies.

Debates

Is the hard problem genuine?

Whether there is a residual explanandum after the functions are explained, or whether deflationary accounts show the problem to be confused.

Epistemic or ontological

Whether the gap is merely a limit on explanation or reflects a real ontological distinctness of experience.

Key figures

• David Chalmers
• Joseph Levine
• Daniel Dennett

Seminal works

• levine1983
• chalmers1995
• chalmers1996

Frequently asked questions

Why is it called the 'hard' problem?

Because, unlike the 'easy' problems of explaining cognitive functions, explaining why those functions are accompanied by subjective experience seems to resist standard scientific explanation.