The Demandingness of Consequentialism

The demandingness objection holds that consequentialism requires agents to sacrifice their own interests and projects to an unreasonable degree, since they must always promote the impartial good.

Definition

The demandingness objection is the claim that because maximizing consequentialism counts each agent's resources as fully available for promoting the impartial good, it leaves agents no morally protected space to pursue their own commitments, and so asks more than morality can reasonably require.

Scope

This topic covers the objection that consequentialism is excessively demanding, the responses available to consequentialists, and the broader theoretical apparatus introduced to address it: agent-centred prerogatives, the distinction between requirement and supererogation, and satisficing alternatives. It connects to debates about the scope of duties to distant strangers.

Core questions

• How much sacrifice may morality demand of an agent for the sake of others?
• Is there a morally protected sphere in which agents may favour their own projects?
• Can consequentialism make room for supererogation, or does it collapse the optional into the obligatory?
• Do we have stringent positive duties to aid distant strangers?

Key theories

Agent-centred prerogatives

Scheffler's proposal that agents are permitted to give disproportionate weight to their own interests and projects, carving out a region where they are not required to maximize the impartial good.

The defence of stringent obligation

Kagan's argument that the demandingness of consequentialism is not a decisive objection, since the intuitions favouring moderate options lack adequate theoretical grounding.

History

Singer (1972) sharpened the demandingness worry by arguing that affluent people are obligated to give until further giving would sacrifice something of comparable moral importance. Scheffler (1982) responded by introducing agent-centred prerogatives within a hybrid theory, while Kagan (1989) defended the demanding implications and challenged the case for moderate options, framing a debate that continues to structure work on the scope of obligation.

Debates

Prerogatives versus impartiality

Granting agents a prerogative to favour themselves preserves ordinary life but appears ad hoc from an impartial standpoint, raising the question of how such a permission can be principled.

The scope of duties to aid

Singer's argument implies very extensive duties to relieve global poverty; critics question whether the underlying principle proves too much or rests on a contested analogy.

Key figures

• Peter Singer
• Samuel Scheffler
• Shelly Kagan
• Bernard Williams

Seminal works

• singer1972
• scheffler1982
• kagan1989

Frequently asked questions

What exactly is the demandingness objection?

It is the worry that consequentialism, by requiring agents always to bring about the best impartial outcome, leaves no room for personal projects and so demands more sacrifice than a reasonable morality should.

How do consequentialists respond?

Responses include adopting satisficing standards, introducing agent-centred prerogatives within a hybrid theory, distinguishing what is blameworthy from what is wrong, or biting the bullet and accepting the demanding conclusion.