Veto Player Analysis
Veto player analysis is a spatial-institutional framework, developed by George Tsebelis in his 1995 article and 2002 book, for predicting the capacity of a political system to change policy. A veto player is any individual or collective actor whose agreement is required to alter the status quo. The theory shows that the potential for policy change shrinks as the number of veto players grows, as the ideological distance between them widens, and as their internal cohesion increases — three structural variables that together determine a system's policy stability independently of constitutional labels such as presidentialism or parliamentarism.
Leer el método completo
Inicia sesión con una cuenta gratuita para leer esta sección.
Mapa de métodos
El vecindario de métodos relacionados: selecciona un nodo para explorarlo.
+4 más
Fuentes
- Tsebelis, G. (2002). Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. Princeton University Press. ISBN: 9780691091891
- Tsebelis, G. (1995). Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism. British Journal of Political Science, 25(3), 289-325. DOI: 10.1017/S0007123400007225 ↗
Cómo citar esta página
ScholarGate. (2026, June 22). Veto Player Theory and Analysis. ScholarGate. https://scholargate.app/es/political-science/veto-player-analysis
¿Qué método?
Coloca este método junto a sus parientes más cercanos y léelos lado a lado: la biblioteca pone los libros sobre la mesa; la elección es tuya.
- Ideal Point EstimationPolitical Science↔ comparar
- Spatial Voting ModelPolitical Science↔ comparar
- Two-Level Game AnalysisPolitical Science↔ comparar
- Voting Power Index AnalysisPolitical Science↔ comparar
Citado por
Métodos similares
¿Has visto un problema en esta página? Infórmanos o sugiere una corrección →