What is the levelling-down objection?

It is the objection that if equality is intrinsically good, then making the better-off worse-off — even when no one is thereby benefited — would be good in one respect, which strikes many as absurd and motivates priority and sufficiency views.

The Priority and Sufficiency Views

The priority and sufficiency views are rivals to egalitarianism that explain our concern for the worse-off without holding that equality matters in itself.

Definition

The priority view holds that benefiting people matters more the worse-off they are, with no intrinsic concern for equality; the sufficiency view holds that justice requires only that everyone reach a threshold of 'enough', not that shares be equal.

Scope

Covers the priority view (prioritarianism), on which benefits matter more the worse-off their recipients are; the sufficiency view (sufficientarianism), on which what matters is that everyone has enough; the levelling-down objection that motivates them; and the debates over thresholds and the shape of the priority function.

Core questions

Does equality matter in itself, or only our concern for the worse-off?
Should we give priority to benefiting the worse-off, regardless of others' levels?
Is the morally important thing that everyone have enough, rather than equal amounts?
Where should a sufficiency threshold be set, and is one threshold enough?

Key concepts

prioritarianism
sufficientarianism
the levelling-down objection
the priority function
the sufficiency threshold
diminishing moral weight

Key theories

The priority view: Parfit argues that, instead of valuing equality, we should hold that benefits matter more the worse-off their recipients are; this 'prioritarian' view captures our concern for the badly off without falling to the levelling-down objection.
The sufficiency view: Frankfurt argues that economic equality is not in itself morally important; what matters morally is that everyone should have enough, so the focus of justice should be sufficiency rather than equality.
Compassion and thresholds: Crisp argues for a compassion-based account with an 'impartial spectator' threshold, on which priority to benefits is capped at the level above which the badly off no longer warrant compassion.

History

Frankfurt's 'Equality as a Moral Ideal' (1987) challenged the value of equality and proposed the sufficiency doctrine. Parfit's 1991 Lindley Lecture, published as 'Equality and Priority' (1997), distinguished the priority view from egalitarianism and showed how it avoids the levelling-down objection, framing much subsequent debate.

Debates

Priority vs. equality: Whether our concern for the worse-off is best captured by giving priority to their benefits without valuing equality (Parfit) or whether equality retains independent value despite levelling-down.
Does sufficiency suffice?: Whether justice is satisfied once everyone has 'enough' (Frankfurt), or whether inequalities above the threshold can still be unjust, a key challenge to sufficientarianism.

Key figures

Derek Parfit
Harry Frankfurt
Roger Crisp
Larry Temkin

Seminal works

parfit1997
frankfurt1987

Frequently asked questions

What is the levelling-down objection?: It is the objection that if equality is intrinsically good, then making the better-off worse-off — even when no one is thereby benefited — would be good in one respect, which strikes many as absurd and motivates priority and sufficiency views.