What is transworld depravity?

It is Plantinga's notion that a creaturely essence suffers transworld depravity if, in every possible world in which God creates that essence as a free agent, it goes wrong at least once; if all essences are like this, God cannot create a sinless world of free creatures.

Does the free will defense explain natural evil?

Not directly, since natural evils like disease and earthquakes are not the result of human free choices; Plantinga suggests it is at least possible that non-human free agents are responsible, while others address natural evil through theodicy instead.

The Free Will Defense

The argument that the value of creaturely free will explains why God's existence is logically compatible with the existence of moral evil.

Definition

The thesis that a world containing significantly free creatures who sometimes do evil can be better than one with no free creatures, and that even an omnipotent God could not create free agents guaranteed always to choose the good, so the coexistence of God and moral evil is possible.

Scope

This topic covers the free will defense as a response to the logical problem of evil, Plantinga's use of possible-worlds semantics and the notion of transworld depravity, and the question of whether libertarian free will is required. It also covers the standard objections, including the compatibilist objection and the difficulty of natural evil. It does not cover soul-making theodicy, treated under theodicy, which makes a stronger explanatory claim.

Core questions

Could an omnipotent God create free creatures who never choose evil?
Does the value of free will outweigh the moral evil it makes possible?
Does the defense require libertarian rather than compatibilist freedom?
Can the defense extend to natural evil, or only to moral evil?

Key theories

Transworld depravity: Plantinga argues it is possibly true that every creaturely essence God could instantiate would, if free, go wrong at least once; if so, God could not actualize a world of free creatures who never sin, so the existence of moral evil is compatible with omnipotence.
Value of significant freedom: On the defense, a world containing creatures who freely choose good and evil is more valuable than a world of automata that always act rightly, giving God a reason to create free agents despite the risk of evil.

History

Free-will responses to evil are ancient, central to Augustine's account, but the rigorous modern form is Plantinga's, developed in The Nature of Necessity and the more accessible God, Freedom, and Evil, both 1974. Plantinga answered Mackie's and Flew's compatibilist objection that God could have made free creatures who always choose good; the defense is now widely regarded as having resolved the logical problem.

Debates

Whether God could create free agents who always choose good: Mackie and Flew argued that an omnipotent God could have made free creatures who freely always do right; Plantinga replies, via transworld depravity, that this may not be within God's power even though it is logically possible in the abstract.
Whether the defense requires libertarian freedom: The defense assumes incompatibilist free will; compatibilists object that if freedom is compatible with determinism, God could determine free creatures to do good, and defenders reply that compatibilist freedom is too weak to carry the relevant value.

Key figures

Augustine of Hippo
Alvin Plantinga
J. L. Mackie
Antony Flew

Seminal works

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plantinga1974

Frequently asked questions

What is transworld depravity?: It is Plantinga's notion that a creaturely essence suffers transworld depravity if, in every possible world in which God creates that essence as a free agent, it goes wrong at least once; if all essences are like this, God cannot create a sinless world of free creatures.
Does the free will defense explain natural evil?: Not directly, since natural evils like disease and earthquakes are not the result of human free choices; Plantinga suggests it is at least possible that non-human free agents are responsible, while others address natural evil through theodicy instead.