The Epistemology of Disagreement in Religion

The study of how awareness of sincere, informed disagreement about religion bears on the rationality of holding one's own religious beliefs.

Definition

The inquiry into whether, and how much, the existence of apparently reasonable people who hold opposing religious views should reduce a believer's confidence in their own position.

Scope

This topic applies the general epistemology of disagreement to religion: it covers the conciliationist demand to reduce confidence in the face of epistemic peers who disagree, the steadfast reply that one may retain belief, and the application of both to deep religious disagreement. It does not cover the soteriological typology of exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism, treated separately.

Core questions

• Does discovering that an epistemic peer disagrees require lowering one's confidence?
• Are parties to deep religious disagreements genuinely epistemic peers?
• Can religious belief remain rational despite pervasive, informed disagreement?
• Do conciliationist norms, if accepted, lead to skepticism about religion?

Key theories

Conciliationism about disagreement

Feldman argues that when genuine epistemic peers share the evidence yet disagree, each should significantly reduce confidence or suspend judgment, which applied to religion appears to demand agnosticism in the face of reasonable disagreement.

Steadfast defense of religious belief

Plantinga and van Inwagen argue that one may rationally retain religious belief despite disagreement, since one need not regard dissenters as epistemic peers in the relevant respect, and the conciliationist principle would, if consistent, undercut much ordinary belief too.

History

Although disagreement has long figured in religious epistemology, the contemporary debate draws on the general epistemology of disagreement that developed in the early twenty-first century, framed by conciliationist and steadfast camps. Van Inwagen's and Plantinga's defenses of holding firm under disagreement, and Feldman's conciliationist application to religion, made religious disagreement a focal test case.

Debates

Whether disagreement requires suspension of belief

Conciliationists hold that reasonable peer disagreement demands reduced confidence; steadfast theorists argue that one may retain belief, and that requiring suspension would generate widespread skepticism well beyond religion.

Whether religious disputants are epistemic peers

The conciliationist conclusion depends on treating opponents as peers with equal evidence and competence; defenders of steadfast belief question whether parties to deep religious disagreement actually share the relevant evidence and faculties.

Key figures

• Alvin Plantinga
• Peter van Inwagen
• Richard Feldman
• Gideon Rosen

Seminal works

• feldman2007
• plantinga1995
• vaninwagen1996

Frequently asked questions

What is an epistemic peer?

An epistemic peer is someone who, with respect to a given question, is roughly equal in relevant evidence, intelligence, and reasoning ability; the debate turns partly on whether religious disputants really stand in this relation.

Does religious disagreement prove that no religion is true?

No. Widespread disagreement is an epistemological challenge about the rationality of belief, not a direct argument about truth; conciliationists think it should lower confidence, while steadfast theorists argue that reasonable belief can persist through disagreement.