Intentionality and Mental Content
Intentionality is the power of minds to be about, represent, or stand for things; mental content is what a given mental state represents.
Definition
Intentionality is the property of mental states whereby they are directed at, about, or represent objects and states of affairs; mental content is the specific representational character that fixes what a state is about.
Scope
This area covers the aboutness of mental states, naturalistic theories of how mental states come to have content, the internalism-externalism debate over whether content depends on the environment, the computational theory of mind, and the structure of propositional attitudes such as belief and desire.
Sub-topics
Core questions
- How can purely physical states be about anything?
- What naturalistic relation makes a state represent what it represents?
- Is mental content fixed by what is inside the head or by the environment?
- How are propositional attitudes such as belief and desire structured?
Key concepts
- aboutness
- mental representation
- naturalized semantics
- content externalism
- language of thought
- propositional attitude
Key theories
- Intentionality as the mark of the mental
- Mental phenomena are distinguished by their directedness upon an object, a feature Brentano took to be absent from the purely physical.
- Informational and causal theories of content
- A state's content is fixed by the information it carries or the states of affairs that reliably cause it, providing a naturalistic basis for representation.
History
Brentano (1874) reintroduced intentionality as the mark of the mental. Twentieth-century philosophers sought to naturalize it: Dretske's informational semantics and Fodor's asymmetric-dependence theory aimed to ground content in physical relations, while Putnam's (1975) Twin Earth argument launched the externalist turn that reshaped debates about where content is fixed.
Debates
- Naturalizing content
- Whether the aboutness of mental states can be explained in non-intentional, physical terms, and which relation does the work.
- Where content is fixed
- Whether the content of a thought depends only on the subject's internal states or also on the external environment.
Key figures
- Franz Brentano
- Fred Dretske
- Hilary Putnam
- Jerry Fodor
Related topics
Seminal works
- brentano1874
- putnam1975
- dretske1981
- fodor1987
Frequently asked questions
- What does 'intentionality' mean in philosophy?
- It refers to the aboutness or directedness of mental states, not to intention in the everyday sense of planning to do something.