Epistemology of Trust and Expertise

Modern knowledge is so specialised that no one can verify most of what they believe, so we depend on experts and on trust; this topic asks how such epistemic dependence can be rational and how a novice can tell which expert to believe.

Definition

The epistemology of trust and expertise studies the rationality of relying on the knowledge of others, especially experts, and the grounds on which a non-expert can identify genuine expertise and decide which of several putative experts to believe.

Scope

This topic covers epistemic dependence on others, the role of trust in knowledge, and the novice-expert and novice-two-experts problems of identifying and adjudicating expertise from a position of relative ignorance. It examines the sources of evidence a layperson can use — arguments, agreement among experts, track records, credentials, and interests — and the tension between intellectual autonomy and rational deference. The broader social organisation of inquiry is treated in the parent area.

Core questions

• Can it be rational to believe something one cannot verify oneself?
• What role does trust play in the transmission and possession of knowledge?
• How can a novice identify a genuine expert?
• When two experts disagree, how can a layperson rationally choose between them?

Key theories

Epistemic dependence and the role of trust

Hardwig argues that because individuals cannot independently check most of what they know, much knowledge rests essentially on trust in others, so that the knower is sometimes the community rather than any single inquirer.

Sources of evidence about experts

Goldman analyses the novice-two-experts problem, identifying the kinds of evidence a layperson can use — the cogency of the experts' arguments, agreement among other experts, track records, credentials, and possible biases or interests.

History

Hardwig's papers of 1985 and 1991 put epistemic dependence and trust on the agenda, arguing that the appeal to authority can be epistemically respectable and even unavoidable in collaborative science. Goldman's 2001 analysis of how novices can assess competing experts sharpened the practical problem, and the topic has gained urgency with debates over public trust in science, misinformation, and expertise.

Debates

Intellectual autonomy versus rational deference

One tradition prizes thinking for oneself and is wary of believing on authority, while the epistemology of expertise argues that rational deference is unavoidable and often epistemically optimal; the dispute concerns how much, and on what grounds, one may responsibly outsource belief to experts.

Key figures

• John Hardwig
• Alvin Goldman

Seminal works

• hardwig1991
• goldman2001

Frequently asked questions

What is the novice-two-experts problem?

It is the problem a layperson faces when two apparent experts disagree and the layperson lacks the expertise to evaluate the substance directly. Goldman asks what indirect evidence — argumentative skill, agreement of further experts, track record, credentials, and interests — a novice can rationally use to decide whom to trust.

Can relying on experts ever give you knowledge?

Many philosophers hold that it can: because we cannot verify most of what we believe, rational reliance on trustworthy experts is a legitimate route to knowledge. The key questions are when such dependence is well placed and how a non-expert can responsibly identify genuine expertise.