Deflationary Theories of Truth

Deflationists deny that truth is a substantive property: to say a proposition is true is to do no more than reassert it, with the truth predicate serving as a logical convenience.

Definition

Deflationism is the view that truth has no underlying nature and that the entire content of the truth predicate is given by the instances of the equivalence schema 'the proposition that p is true iff p'.

Scope

This topic covers the family of deflationary theories — the redundancy theory, disquotationalism, and minimalism — which hold that the concept of truth is fully captured by the equivalence between asserting that p is true and asserting that p. It treats the explanatory role of the T-schema, the indispensability of 'true' for expressing generalizations such as 'everything the witness said is true', and objections concerning whether deflationism can account for truth's role in meaning, validity, and inquiry.

Core questions

• Is truth a substantive property in need of analysis, or merely a logical device?
• What work does the truth predicate do if it adds nothing to plain assertion?
• Can deflationism explain the role of truth in semantics and logical consequence?
• Which truth-bearers and which version of the schema should deflationists adopt?

Key concepts

• equivalence (T) schema
• redundancy theory
• disquotation
• generalization device
• truth-bearers
• deflationism vs. inflationism

Key theories

Minimalism

Horwich's minimal theory takes the uncontroversial instances of the equivalence schema as exhausting the meaning and function of 'true', so truth has no hidden essence and no need of a reductive analysis.

Disquotationalism

Following Ramsey and Quine, the truth predicate is a device of disquotation whose chief utility is enabling generalization over sentences, as in affirming or denying many claims at once without listing them.

History

Ramsey's 1927 redundancy theory launched deflationism; Quine developed the disquotational idea, and Grover the prosentential variant. Horwich's Truth (1990/1998) gave the canonical minimalist statement, and Field debated whether a deflationary truth predicate can underwrite an adequate theory of meaning and content.

Debates

Can deflationism explain truth's theoretical role?

Whether a deflationary truth predicate can account for the use of truth in stating the goal of inquiry, defining validity, and grounding meaning, or whether these roles show that truth is a substantive property after all.

Key figures

• Frank Ramsey
• W. V. O. Quine
• Paul Horwich
• Hartry Field
• Dorothy Grover

Seminal works

• horwich1998
• quine1970

Frequently asked questions

If truth is redundant, why do we need the word 'true'?

Even deflationists grant that 'true' is useful as a device of generalization. To endorse everything a trustworthy source says without repeating each claim, we say 'everything she said is true'. The predicate lets us make such blind or infinite generalizations, which is its main practical role on the deflationary view.