Collective Intentionality
Collective intentionality is the capacity of minds to be jointly directed at objects, goals, and actions — the 'we' that underlies acting, intending, and believing together.
Definition
Collective intentionality is intentionality (intending, believing, desiring) that is shared by or attributed to a plurality of agents acting or thinking together, as when several people intend to perform an action jointly.
Scope
Covers theories of shared intention and joint action: reductive planning accounts (Bratman), irreducible 'we-intentions' (Searle, Tuomela), and obligation-generating joint commitment (Gilbert). It is foundational for the broader topics of social ontology and group agency.
Core questions
- What is it for several people to intend to do something together?
- Can shared intention be reduced to the intentions of individuals?
- Are 'we-intentions' a primitive form of intentionality?
- Do shared intentions generate obligations among participants?
Key concepts
- shared intention
- we-intentions
- joint commitment
- the planning theory
- meshing subplans
- mutual responsiveness
- joint action
Key theories
- The planning theory of shared agency
- Bratman analyses shared intention in terms of interlocking individual intentions — each intends that the group act and that they do so by way of meshing subplans and mutual responsiveness — without positing any irreducible group mind.
- We-intentions
- Searle argues that collective intentionality is a biologically primitive phenomenon: a 'we-intend' is not reducible to a set of 'I-intend' states plus mutual belief, but is a distinct form of intentionality in individual minds.
- Joint commitment
- Gilbert argues that shared intention rests on a joint commitment by the parties to intend as a body, which generates correlative obligations and entitlements that distinguish acting together from merely coinciding action.
History
Collective intentionality became a distinct topic in the late 1980s and 1990s through the work of Tuomela and Miller, Gilbert (1989), Searle (1990), and Bratman, who debated whether shared intention reduces to individual states or requires irreducible 'we'-attitudes or joint commitments. Bratman's planning theory was consolidated in Shared Agency (2014).
Debates
- Reductive vs. non-reductive accounts
- Whether shared intention can be analysed in terms of individuals' interlocking intentions and beliefs (Bratman) or requires an irreducible 'we'-intention (Searle) or joint commitment (Gilbert).
- Does shared intention create obligations?
- Whether merely sharing an intention obligates the parties to one another, as Gilbert holds, or whether obligations require something further, as Bratman's account implies.
Key figures
- Michael Bratman
- John Searle
- Margaret Gilbert
- Raimo Tuomela
Related topics
Seminal works
- bratman2014
- gilbert1989
- searle1990
Frequently asked questions
- Is there a 'group mind' behind collective intentionality?
- Most theorists deny any literal group mind: reductive accounts locate shared intention in interrelated individual attitudes, and even non-reductive views like Searle's place the 'we-intention' within individual heads rather than in a separate group consciousness.