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| Counterfactual Analysis× | Bargaining Model of War× | |
|---|---|---|
| Fagområde | International Relations | International Relations |
| Familie≠ | Process / pipeline | MCDM |
| Oprindelsesår≠ | 1991 | 1995 |
| Ophavsperson≠ | James Fearon (methodological treatment); Tetlock & Belkin (framework) | James D. Fearon |
| Type≠ | Method of causal reasoning via hypothetical alternatives | Formal model of war as bargaining failure |
| Oprindelig kilde≠ | Fearon, J. D. (1991). Counterfactuals and hypothesis testing in political science. World Politics, 43(2), 169–195. DOI ↗ | Fearon, J. D. (1995). Rationalist explanations for war. International Organization, 49(3), 379–414. DOI ↗ |
| Aliasser | Counterfactual Reasoning in IR, What-If Analysis in International Relations, Counterfactual Thought Experiments, Hypothetical Case Analysis | Rationalist Explanations for War, Bargaining Theory of War, Crisis Bargaining Model, Fearon Bargaining Model |
| Relaterede | 3 | 3 |
| Resumé≠ | Counterfactual analysis evaluates causal claims in international relations by reasoning about what would have happened had some antecedent been different: had the archduke not been assassinated, had the United States not deployed missiles, had a leader chosen otherwise. As Fearon (1991) argues, such counterfactuals play a necessary if often implicit role in testing hypotheses about singular and small-N events, where ordinary statistical comparison is impossible. Done rigorously — with plausible antecedents, sound connecting principles, and attention to confounders — counterfactual analysis disciplines the 'what if' reasoning that pervades historical and conflict explanation. | The bargaining model of war, given its canonical statement by James Fearon in 'Rationalist Explanations for War' (1995), treats war not as the failure of reason but as a failure of bargaining. Because fighting is costly and uncertain, there almost always exists a peaceful division of the disputed stakes that both rational states would prefer to the gamble of war. The puzzle, and the model's central contribution, is to identify the specific conditions — private information with incentives to misrepresent, commitment problems, and issue indivisibility — under which rational, unitary states nonetheless fail to reach such a settlement. |
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