Sammenlign metoder

	Audience Cost Analysis	Democratic Peace Analysis
Fagområde	International Relations	International Relations
Familie	MCDM	Process / pipeline
Oprindelsesår	1994	1993
Ophavsperson	James D. Fearon	Zeev Maoz & Bruce Russett (and the broader democratic-peace literature)
Type	Formal signaling mechanism in crisis bargaining	Observational dyadic test of the regime-type/conflict relationship
Oprindelig kilde	Fearon, J. D. (1994). Domestic political audiences and the escalation of international disputes. American Political Science Review, 88(3), 577–592.	Maoz, Z., & Russett, B. (1993). Normative and structural causes of democratic peace, 1946–1986. American Political Science Review, 87(3), 624–638.
Aliasser	Audience Costs Theory, Domestic Audience Cost Model, Tying-Hands Signaling, Audience Cost Mechanism	Democratic Peace Theory Testing, Dyadic Democratic Peace Analysis, Joint Democracy and Conflict Analysis, Liberal Peace Analysis
Relaterede	3	3
Resumé	Audience cost analysis studies how the domestic political punishment a leader expects for publicly backing down from an international threat makes that threat credible. Introduced formally by James Fearon (1994), the mechanism explains why a leader who escalates a crisis in public ties their own hands: retreating would expose them to costs imposed by domestic audiences for looking weak or incompetent. These accumulating audience costs let states signal resolve, and because democracies can generate larger and more reliable audience costs, the concept underpins prominent arguments about regime type, crisis behavior, and the democratic peace.	Democratic peace analysis is the empirical study of the proposition that democracies rarely or never fight one another. Building on the dyadic research design crystallized by Maoz and Russett (1993), it codes the regime type of each state, constructs dyad-years, and models the probability of militarized conflict as a function of joint democracy alongside controls for power, contiguity, alliances, and trade. The approach has produced one of the most robust empirical regularities in international relations and a long debate over whether shared norms or institutional structures account for it.