Compara mètodes

	Vote Buying Analysis	Economic Voting Analysis
Camp	Political Economy	Political Economy
Família	Regression model	MCDM
Any d'origen	2008	1971
Autor original	Simeon Nichter; Ezequiel Gonzalez-Ocantos et al.	Gerald Kramer; Michael Lewis-Beck & Mary Stegmaier
Tipus	Measurement-and-targeting regression model	Formal reward-punishment model of voting
Font seminal	Nichter, S. (2008). Vote Buying or Turnout Buying? Machine Politics and the Secret Ballot. American Political Science Review, 102(1), 19-31.	Kramer, G. H. (1971). Short-Term Fluctuations in U.S. Voting Behavior, 1896-1964. American Political Science Review, 65(1), 131-143.
Àlies	Electoral Clientelism Measurement, Turnout Buying Analysis, Vote-Buying Targeting Model, List-Experiment Vote Buying	Reward-Punishment Model, Retrospective Voting Model, Economic Vote Function, Responsibility Hypothesis
Relacionats	3	4
Resum	Vote buying analysis is the measurement-and-modeling toolkit for studying the distribution of private goods or cash in exchange for electoral support. Two problems define the field. First, who is being paid: Simeon Nichter's 2008 article showed that machines frequently engage in turnout buying — paying their own already-loyal supporters to show up — rather than the classic vote buying of swing voters, a distinction with sharp implications for who gets targeted. Second, how to measure something respondents are reluctant to admit: Gonzalez-Ocantos and colleagues' 2012 study demonstrated that direct survey questions sharply understate vote buying because of social-desirability bias and that list experiments recover far higher, more credible prevalence. Vote buying analysis combines such debiased measurement with regression models of targeting.	Economic voting analysis is the formal study of how voters reward or punish incumbents according to economic performance. In the reward-punishment (retrospective) model pioneered by Gerald Kramer in 1971, support for the governing party is a function of recent economic outcomes — growth, unemployment, and inflation — so that good times re-elect incumbents and bad times turn them out. Michael Lewis-Beck and Mary Stegmaier's 2000 review consolidated the field, establishing that economic voting is predominantly sociotropic (based on the national economy rather than personal finances) and that its strength depends on the clarity of responsibility: how easily voters can attribute outcomes to the incumbent.