Compara mètodes

	Equilibri Perfecte de Subjocs	Competició de Stackelberg
Camp	Teoria de jocs	Teoria de jocs
Família	Machine learning	Machine learning
Any d'origen	1965	1934
Autor original	Reinhard Selten	Heinrich von Stackelberg
Tipus	algorithm	algorithm
Font seminal	Selten, R. (1965). Spieltheoretische Behandlung eines Oligopolmodells mit Nachfrageträgheit. Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 121, 301-324.	von Stackelberg, H. (1934). Marktform und Gleichgewicht. Julius Springer.
Àlies	Backward Induction, Sequential Equilibrium, Extensive-Form Equilibrium	Quantity Leadership, Sequential Oligopoly, Stackelberg Equilibrium
Relacionats	4	4
Resum	Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) is a refinement of Nash Equilibrium for sequential games, introduced by Reinhard Selten in 1965. It requires that strategy profiles constitute a Nash Equilibrium in every subgame, eliminating non-credible threats and incredible promises. Backward induction is the primary computational method for finding SPE in finite games.	Stackelberg Competition models sequential oligopolistic markets where one firm (the leader) commits to a quantity first, and other firms (followers) observe this choice and respond. Introduced by Heinrich von Stackelberg in 1934, the model captures first-mover advantage in quantity-setting competition. The resulting Stackelberg Equilibrium, found by backward induction, yields the leader higher profit than simultaneous (Cournot) competition.