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| Competició de Stackelberg× | Competència de Cournot× | |
|---|---|---|
| Camp | Teoria de jocs | Teoria de jocs |
| Família | Machine learning | Machine learning |
| Any d'origen≠ | 1934 | 1838 |
| Autor original≠ | Heinrich von Stackelberg | Augustin-Louis Cournot |
| Tipus | algorithm | algorithm |
| Font seminal≠ | von Stackelberg, H. (1934). Marktform und Gleichgewicht. Julius Springer. link ↗ | Cournot, A. A. (1838). Recherches sur les principes mathématiques de la théorie des richesses. L. Hachette. link ↗ |
| Àlies | Quantity Leadership, Sequential Oligopoly, Stackelberg Equilibrium | Quantity Competition, Cournot Equilibrium, Cournot-Nash Equilibrium |
| Relacionats | 4 | 4 |
| Resum≠ | Stackelberg Competition models sequential oligopolistic markets where one firm (the leader) commits to a quantity first, and other firms (followers) observe this choice and respond. Introduced by Heinrich von Stackelberg in 1934, the model captures first-mover advantage in quantity-setting competition. The resulting Stackelberg Equilibrium, found by backward induction, yields the leader higher profit than simultaneous (Cournot) competition. | Cournot Competition models oligopolistic markets where firms choose quantities simultaneously, not prices. Originally formulated by Augustin-Louis Cournot in 1838, the model assumes each firm's profit depends on the total market quantity produced. The resulting Cournot-Nash Equilibrium captures the strategic interaction where each firm maximizes profit given competitors' quantities, leading to prices between monopoly and perfect competition levels. |
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