Compara mètodes

	Teoria de Jocs Evolutiva	Equilibri de Nash Bayesiana
Camp	Teoria de jocs	Teoria de jocs
Família	Machine learning	Machine learning
Any d'origen	1973	1967
Autor original	John Maynard Smith, George Price	John Harsanyi
Tipus	algorithm	algorithm
Font seminal	Smith, J. M., & Price, G. R. (1973). The logic of animal conflict. Nature, 246(5427), 15-18.	Harsanyi, J. C. (1967). Games with incomplete information played by Bayesian players, Parts I, II, and III. Management Science, 14(3), 159-182.
Àlies	ESS, Evolutionarily Stable Strategy, Replicator Dynamics	BNE, Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, Type-Contingent Equilibrium
Relacionats	4	4
Resum	Evolutionary Game Theory applies game-theoretic reasoning to biological evolution and social dynamics, where populations of agents with different strategies interact repeatedly. Introduced by John Maynard Smith and George Price in 1973, the framework uses the concept of Evolutionarily Stable Strategies (ESS) to identify strategy distributions that cannot be invaded by mutant strategies. Replicator dynamics describe how strategy frequencies evolve over time when reproduction is proportional to payoff success.	Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) extends Nash Equilibrium to games with incomplete information, where players lack full knowledge of others' payoff functions. Introduced by John Harsanyi in 1967, BNE models strategic interaction under uncertainty by representing unknown payoffs as players' private types drawn from a probability distribution. Equilibrium is found by solving for type-contingent strategies that are best responses to all possible type realizations.