Compara mètodes
Revisa els mètodes seleccionats l'un al costat de l'altre; les files que difereixen es ressalten.
| Coalition Formation Analysis× | Spatial Voting Model× | |
|---|---|---|
| Camp≠ | Political Economy | Political Science |
| Família | MCDM | MCDM |
| Any d'origen≠ | 1962 | 1957 |
| Autor original≠ | William Riker; Michael Laver & Norman Schofield | Harold Hotelling, Duncan Black & Anthony Downs |
| Tipus≠ | Formal theory of coalition selection | Formal model of electoral and legislative choice |
| Font seminal≠ | Riker, W. H. (1962). The Theory of Political Coalitions. Yale University Press. ISBN: 9780300001754 | Downs, A. (1957). An Economic Theory of Democracy. Harper & Row. ISBN: 9780060417505 |
| Àlies | Minimal Winning Coalition Theory, Riker Size Principle, Coalition Theory, Government Coalition Analysis | Spatial Theory of Voting, Downsian Model, Proximity Voting Model, Median Voter Model |
| Relacionats | 4 | 4 |
| Resum≠ | Coalition formation analysis is the formal study of which subset of parties will combine to form a governing or decision-making coalition when no single party commands a majority. William Riker's 1962 The Theory of Political Coalitions supplied the foundational logic: under pure office-seeking, rational politicians form minimal winning coalitions and, by the size principle, the smallest winning coalition possible, so that the spoils of office are divided among as few partners as necessary. Michael Laver and Norman Schofield's 1990 Multiparty Government enriched this with policy-seeking motives, showing that coalitions also tend to be ideologically connected. The framework predicts coalition membership from seat shares and party positions. | The spatial voting model represents voters and political alternatives as points in a common geometric policy space and assumes that each voter supports the alternative nearest to their own ideal point. Rooted in Hotelling's location theory, Duncan Black's 1948 single-peakedness result, and Anthony Downs's 1957 economic theory of democracy, the model yields two foundational results: the median voter theorem, which identifies the equilibrium policy in one dimension, and the Downsian prediction that two vote-seeking parties converge toward the center. It is the workhorse formalism behind modern empirical estimation of political positions. |
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