Redistribution Preference Analysis
Redistribution preference analysis examines why individuals support or oppose government efforts to reduce inequality. The self-interest baseline comes from Meltzer and Richard's 1981 model, in which the demand for redistribution falls with one's own income because the rich pay more and receive less from transfers. Benabou and Ok's 2001 POUM (prospect of upward mobility) hypothesis adds a forward-looking twist: people who expect to climb the income ladder may oppose redistribution even when currently poor, because they anticipate being net payers tomorrow. A third strand emphasizes beliefs about fairness — whether success reflects effort or luck. The empirical method is an individual-level survey regression, typically ordered logit or multilevel, of redistribution attitudes on income, mobility expectations, beliefs, and contextual factors.
Прочетете целия метод
Влезте с безплатен профил, за да прочетете този раздел.
Карта на методите
Обкръжението на сродните методи — изберете възел, за да го разгледате.
Източници
- Meltzer, A. H., & Richard, S. F. (1981). A Rational Theory of the Size of Government. Journal of Political Economy, 89(5), 914-927. DOI: 10.1086/261013 ↗
- Benabou, R., & Ok, E. A. (2001). Social Mobility and the Demand for Redistribution: The POUM Hypothesis. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(2), 447-487. DOI: 10.1162/00335530151144078 ↗
Как да цитирате тази страница
ScholarGate. (2026, June 22). Analysis of Individual Preferences for Redistribution. ScholarGate. https://scholargate.app/bg/political-economy/redistribution-preference-analysis
Кой метод?
Поставете този метод до най-близките му сродни методи и ги четете едно до друго — библиотеката полага книгите на масата; изборът е ваш.
- Fiscal Sociology AnalysisPolitical Economy↔ сравняване
- Meltzer-Richard ModelPolitical Economy↔ сравняване
- Welfare Regime AnalysisPolitical Economy↔ сравняване
Цитиран в
Подобни методи
Забелязахте ли проблем на тази страница? Съобщете или предложете поправка →