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| Конкуренция на Щакелберг× | Байесов равновесен модел на Наш (Bayesian Nash Equilibrium, BNE)× | |
|---|---|---|
| Област | Теория на игрите | Теория на игрите |
| Семейство | Machine learning | Machine learning |
| Година на възникване≠ | 1934 | 1967 |
| Създател≠ | Heinrich von Stackelberg | John Harsanyi |
| Тип | algorithm | algorithm |
| Основополагащ източник≠ | von Stackelberg, H. (1934). Marktform und Gleichgewicht. Julius Springer. link ↗ | Harsanyi, J. C. (1967). Games with incomplete information played by Bayesian players, Parts I, II, and III. Management Science, 14(3), 159-182. DOI ↗ |
| Други названия | Quantity Leadership, Sequential Oligopoly, Stackelberg Equilibrium | BNE, Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, Type-Contingent Equilibrium |
| Свързани | 4 | 4 |
| Резюме≠ | Stackelberg Competition models sequential oligopolistic markets where one firm (the leader) commits to a quantity first, and other firms (followers) observe this choice and respond. Introduced by Heinrich von Stackelberg in 1934, the model captures first-mover advantage in quantity-setting competition. The resulting Stackelberg Equilibrium, found by backward induction, yields the leader higher profit than simultaneous (Cournot) competition. | Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) extends Nash Equilibrium to games with incomplete information, where players lack full knowledge of others' payoff functions. Introduced by John Harsanyi in 1967, BNE models strategic interaction under uncertainty by representing unknown payoffs as players' private types drawn from a probability distribution. Equilibrium is found by solving for type-contingent strategies that are best responses to all possible type realizations. |
| ScholarGateНабор от данни ↗ |
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