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Равновесие на Наш×Стойност на Шейпли×
ОбластТеория на игритеТеория на игрите
СемействоMachine learningMachine learning
Година на възникване19501953
СъздателJohn NashLloyd Shapley
Типalgorithmalgorithm
Основополагащ източникNash, J. F. (1950). Equilibrium points in N-person games. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 36(1), 48-49. DOI ↗Shapley, L. S. (1953). A value for n-person games. In H. W. Kuhn & A. W. Tucker (Eds.), Contributions to the Theory of Games II (pp. 307-317). Princeton University Press. DOI ↗
Други названияLemke-Howson Equilibrium, Completely Labeled PairFair Division, Cooperative Game Solution, Dividend Vector
Свързани44
РезюмеNash Equilibrium is a game-theoretic solution concept where no player can unilaterally deviate to improve their payoff. Formalized by John Nash in 1950, the Lemke-Howson algorithm computationally finds equilibria in bimatrix games by identifying completely labeled vertex pairs in the strategy polytopes.The Shapley Value is a solution concept for coalition games that distributes total payoff fairly among players based on their marginal contributions to coalitions. Introduced by Lloyd Shapley in 1953, the Shapley Value is the unique payoff distribution that satisfies four intuitive axioms: efficiency (total payoff is distributed), symmetry (identical players receive equal payoff), null player (players contributing nothing receive nothing), and additivity across games.
ScholarGateНабор от данни
  1. v1
  2. 2 Източници
  3. PUBLISHED
  1. v1
  2. 2 Източници
  3. PUBLISHED

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ScholarGateСравнение на методи: Nash Equilibrium · Shapley Value. Извлечено на 2026-06-18 от https://scholargate.app/bg/compare