Veto Player Analysis
Veto player analysis is a spatial-institutional framework, developed by George Tsebelis in his 1995 article and 2002 book, for predicting the capacity of a political system to change policy. A veto player is any individual or collective actor whose agreement is required to alter the status quo. The theory shows that the potential for policy change shrinks as the number of veto players grows, as the ideological distance between them widens, and as their internal cohesion increases — three structural variables that together determine a system's policy stability independently of constitutional labels such as presidentialism or parliamentarism.
源记录
引文逐字复制自方法源记录。这些引文不代表任何层级的验证。
- Tsebelis, G. (2002). Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. Princeton University Press. · ISBN 9780691091891
- Tsebelis, G. (1995). Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism. British Journal of Political Science, 25(3), 289-325. · DOI 10.1017/S0007123400007225
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