Government Formation Model
The government formation model is a non-cooperative bargaining theory explaining how a cabinet and the division of its portfolios emerge when no party holds a majority. In the canonical Baron-Ferejohn (1989) framework, a head of state or chance mechanism recognizes one party as formateur with a probability often proportional to its seat share; the formateur proposes a government and an allocation of the spoils of office, and the proposal takes effect only if a legislative majority accepts. Austen-Smith and Banks (1988) embed this in an electoral and coalition setting. The model's signature result is a proposer (formateur) advantage: the party that gets to propose secures a disproportionate share of portfolios.
源记录
引文逐字复制自方法源记录。这些引文不代表任何层级的验证。
- Baron, D. P., & Ferejohn, J. A. (1989). Bargaining in Legislatures. American Political Science Review, 83(4), 1181-1206. · DOI 10.2307/1961664
- Austen-Smith, D., & Banks, J. (1988). Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes. American Political Science Review, 82(2), 405-422. · DOI 10.2307/1957392
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