So sánh phương pháp

	Varieties of Capitalism Analysis	Veto Player Analysis
Lĩnh vực	Political Economy	Political Science
Họ	Process / pipeline	MCDM
Năm ra đời	2001	1995
Người khởi xướng	Peter A. Hall & David Soskice	George Tsebelis
Loại	Comparative institutional analysis framework	Comparative institutional analysis framework
Công trình gốc	Hall, P. A., & Soskice, D. (Eds.). (2001). Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage. Oxford University Press. ISBN: 9780199247752	Tsebelis, G. (2002). Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. Princeton University Press. ISBN: 9780691091891
Tên gọi khác	VoC Analysis, Varieties of Capitalism Framework, Hall-Soskice Framework, Comparative Capitalisms Analysis	Veto Players Theory, Veto Points Analysis, Tsebelis Veto Player Framework, Policy Stability Analysis
Liên quan	4	4
Tóm tắt	Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) analysis is a firm-centered comparative framework, set out by Peter A. Hall and David Soskice in their 2001 edited volume, for understanding why advanced capitalist economies are organized in systematically different ways. Its central move is to place the firm at the heart of the analysis and to ask how firms resolve the coordination problems they face with workers, owners, suppliers, and one another. The framework distinguishes two ideal types — Liberal Market Economies (LMEs) such as the United States and United Kingdom, where firms coordinate primarily through competitive markets, and Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs) such as Germany and Japan, where firms coordinate strategically through non-market institutions — and argues that institutions in different spheres reinforce one another to produce distinct, durable, and internally coherent national models with their own comparative institutional advantages.	Veto player analysis is a spatial-institutional framework, developed by George Tsebelis in his 1995 article and 2002 book, for predicting the capacity of a political system to change policy. A veto player is any individual or collective actor whose agreement is required to alter the status quo. The theory shows that the potential for policy change shrinks as the number of veto players grows, as the ideological distance between them widens, and as their internal cohesion increases — three structural variables that together determine a system's policy stability independently of constitutional labels such as presidentialism or parliamentarism.