So sánh phương pháp

	Street-Level Bureaucracy Analysis	Principal-Agent Analysis in the Public Sector
Lĩnh vực	Public Administration	Public Administration
Họ	Process / pipeline	Process / pipeline
Năm ra đời	1980	1984
Người khởi xướng	Michael Lipsky	Terry M. Moe
Loại	Qualitative frontline-implementation analysis	Institutional-economics analysis
Công trình gốc	Lipsky, M. (1980). Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. ISBN: 9780871545442	Moe, T. M. (1984). The New Economics of Organization. American Journal of Political Science, 28(4), 739–777.
Tên gọi khác	Frontline Discretion Analysis, Street-Level Discretion Study, Lipsky Street-Level Bureaucracy Framework	Public Principal-Agent Analysis, Agency Theory in Government, Political Control Delegation Analysis
Liên quan	4	4
Tóm tắt	Street-level bureaucracy analysis examines how frontline public employees — teachers, police officers, caseworkers, benefits clerks and nurses — exercise discretion when they deliver services directly to citizens. Coined by Michael Lipsky in his 1980 book Street-Level Bureaucracy, the approach argues that the decisions these workers make under conditions of scarce resources and conflicting demands effectively become public policy. The method studies how routines, coping strategies and informal rationing shape what citizens actually receive, often diverging from the policy written by legislators. Its goal is to explain the gap between policy as designed and policy as experienced at the counter.	Principal-agent analysis in the public sector applies agency theory to the chains of delegation that run through government — from voters to legislators, legislators to executives, and executives to bureaucracies. Terry Moe's 1984 article The New Economics of Organization brought this institutional-economics lens into the study of public bureaucracy, asking how political principals can control agents who have their own interests and superior information. The method identifies the principal and agent, specifies how their goals diverge, characterises the information asymmetry between them, and examines the control mechanisms principals use to limit agency losses. Its purpose is to explain bureaucratic behaviour and the design of oversight as the predictable result of delegation under conflicting incentives.