So sánh phương pháp

	Cạnh tranh Stackelberg	Cân bằng hoàn hảo trong trò chơi con
Lĩnh vực	Lý thuyết trò chơi	Lý thuyết trò chơi
Họ	Machine learning	Machine learning
Năm ra đời	1934	1965
Người khởi xướng	Heinrich von Stackelberg	Reinhard Selten
Loại	algorithm	algorithm
Công trình gốc	von Stackelberg, H. (1934). Marktform und Gleichgewicht. Julius Springer.	Selten, R. (1965). Spieltheoretische Behandlung eines Oligopolmodells mit Nachfrageträgheit. Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 121, 301-324.
Tên gọi khác	Quantity Leadership, Sequential Oligopoly, Stackelberg Equilibrium	Backward Induction, Sequential Equilibrium, Extensive-Form Equilibrium
Liên quan	4	4
Tóm tắt	Stackelberg Competition models sequential oligopolistic markets where one firm (the leader) commits to a quantity first, and other firms (followers) observe this choice and respond. Introduced by Heinrich von Stackelberg in 1934, the model captures first-mover advantage in quantity-setting competition. The resulting Stackelberg Equilibrium, found by backward induction, yields the leader higher profit than simultaneous (Cournot) competition.	Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) is a refinement of Nash Equilibrium for sequential games, introduced by Reinhard Selten in 1965. It requires that strategy profiles constitute a Nash Equilibrium in every subgame, eliminating non-credible threats and incredible promises. Backward induction is the primary computational method for finding SPE in finite games.